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I. Introduction
State citizenship grants the citizen many rights, but the rights most fundamental to a democracy
are the right to vote and the right to run for elected office. In the traditional formulations of the
nation-state, it has been clear who possesses these rights, but over the last half-century,
widespread international migration has complicated the definition of the citizen and has called
into question the perceived unity between the nation and the state, between citizenship and
nationality, and between civic participation and national identity. In this study, I will examine
these complications in the specific case of the Netherlands, a country particularly well known for
its recent history of cosmopolitanism. I will examine the effect of these debates on citizenship,
and national identity on the ability of migrants to become involved in the Dutch political system
as well as the nature of their civic participation. From the basis of this research, I will argue that
immigrant political participation is a useful measure of civic integration and that the civic
integration that comes with this participation can lead to an increased tolerance of difference
within society, which can help to create a new civically, rather than culturally, based national
identity. Furthermore, the presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities in local and national
politics helps to maintain the relevance of the Dutch state to its population in today’s globalized
world. For this reason, research on the subject of immigrant political integration is important for
understanding both the present and future situations of countries receiving immigrants.
The first major section of the essay begins by defining and presenting the history of concepts
like nationality, citizenship, and the nation-state. I present the current academic debates
surrounding these subjects, including questions of whether it is still proper to speak of the nationstate as a unified entity, the effects of multiple citizenship and migration on the international
system, as well as propositions regarding potential future forms of citizenship. To conclude the
section, I describe the shape of the academic debate about multicultural states and
multiculturalism.
The second section of the article presents the historical context of Dutch multicultural policy as
it has changed over the past five decades. I discuss the concept of autochthony and describe the
consequences of how it has been used in the Netherlands for present-day migrants. The third
section presents the academic debate surrounding policies for the political integration of
minorities. It explores the idea of descriptive representation and evaluates the value of that type
of representation for minority groups. It also describes the general political situation of migrants
within Europe. The fourth section places the situation of migrant politicians in the Netherlands in
the context of other European nations. I will use this comparison to draw conclusions about the
effect of the Dutch political system, immigration debate, and citizenship policy on migrant
political participation, as well as the effects of migrant political participation on the national
identities of Dutch migrants and non-migrants.
II. Theorizing Civic and National Belonging
A. Is the Nation-State Still Relevant?
The model of the nation-state that saw an inherent link between national-cultural identity and
state-civic identity developed at a time before the increasing interconnectedness and heightened
mobility offered by modern globalization. Now, faced with the pressures of increased migration,
the nation-state has struggled to respond. As stated by Castles and Miller, “international
migration has changed the face of societies.”1 Globalizing trends, driven by advances in
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communications and transportation technology, have made it easier than ever before for human
beings to move from one place to another and communicate over long distances, with little or no
attention to either the man-made or natural boundaries that have historically kept people apart.
One result of this heightened mobility is that it becomes “easier to have important and durable
relationships of a political, economic, social or cultural nature in two or more societies at once.”2
In addition to all the positive consequences that this increased interconnectedness can have for
societies, it also creates challenges to formerly stable systems of association. Among these
systems is the model of the modern nation-state, a model that assumes the primacy of all of its
citizens’ loyalty. This primacy of loyalty is now threatened by the ease with which members of
any one state can communicate with members of any other state, resulting not only in
international cultural flows, but also transnational flows that “ignore, subvert, and devalue rather
than celebrate national boundaries.”3 Rather than having distinct states with distinct national
cultures, many see a growing trend toward transnational cultures that extend beyond the reach of
state boundaries.
B. Multiple Citizenship and National Identity in the Multicultural State
Although “citizenship” and “nationality” are often used interchangeably, it is important in this
essay to understand the ways in which the terms are used differently within academic
discussions, and the connotations that each term has when used to discuss individual and group
membership in a community. Both terms refer to a certain kind of belonging on the part of the
individual to a larger whole, but they are distinct in the type of belonging. Jussi Ronkainen
defines the terms in this way: “dual citizenship is demarcated to mean political status and rights
and dual nationality to refer to socio-cultural belonging and identity.”4 At the time of the
formation of the nation-state, these two types of belonging were seen as inextricably linked, but
as we enter a globalized world it is necessary to question the hyphenation of the nation-state and
begin to see nationality as an identity that can be uncoupled from the legal framework of the
state.
Globalization has made it possible for people in different countries to feel “emotionally and
culturally connected,” and to “ignore or at least try to ignore the national boundaries that
separate them.”5 Responding to these increasing transnational cultural tendencies, and in order to
remain relevant to their citizens, states have responded in two contradictory ways. First, states
have moved toward “the rewriting [of national] identity in civic terms.”6 Prior to this
development, national identity was largely discussed in cultural and ethnic terms, but due to the
growth of transnational cultural identity, nation-states have been forced to look for other means
of self-identification. Rather than looking to a shared history, states have turned to a vocabulary
of “common values, shared interests and a set of common institutions” as the ties that bind
members of a nation together.7 Second, and in effect largely counteracting the first effort, states
have “adopted stricter immigration and asylum laws, [and] introduced citizenship tests which
check for the compatibility of the culture of the newcomer.”8 These measures, among others,
“indirectly aim at preserving the ideal of a cultural-ethnic character of the nation.”9
Marco Antonisch proposes an alternative method of binding a nation together that focuses on
the common experiences that residents of a “politico-institutional bounded space” share, rather
than cultural or ethnic similarity.10 For Antonisch, “while ethnicity (or kinship) is an important
mechanism in generating social integration, this latter is also produced by two other mechanisms:
the functional division of labour and the political organization of space.”11 In his article,
Antonisch chooses to focus more on the second of these two mechanisms, arguing that the very
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act of “living together” in the same space can help to create a “sentiment of awareness of what is
common” that can help to bind a society together.12
Rainier Bauböck approaches the problem differently, and echoes Bhikhu Parekh when he says
that multicultural societies resulting from migration must build cohesion “on a foundation of
diversity rather than of similarity.”13 For him, the real problem with the current formulation of
the nation-state is that it views identities as exclusive and loyalties as overriding.14 Bauböck sees
a trend back towards the melting-pot model of multiculturalism, which requires “that immigrants
must adopt the national identity of the receiving country as their primary affiliation.”15 This idea
is flawed, according to Bauböck, due to the fact that it ignores the real influence of transnational
migration flows on the “pluralistic transformation of destination societies.”16 With respect to this
new paradigm, he believes that, “we should conceive of [migrant] identities as overarching and
overlapping rather than as overriding.”17
Steven Dijkstra and colleagues see a similar deficiency in the current linkage of citizenship
rights with “a specific national-cultural identity,” which results in “a situation in which not every
resident of a state has access to full citizenship and its corresponding rights.”18 However, their
solution to this problem is slightly different. They propose a mechanism that they label “postnational citizenship,” which would grant citizenship rights to any resident within a state’s
boundaries who has lived within that state for a certain period of time.19 The objective of their
idea of post-national citizenship, like Bauböck’s conception of overarching and overlapping
national-cultural identities, is not to create a mechanism “to realize a unity in society” but rather
“to organize plurality.”20 These goals are differentiated from Antonisch’s search for a
mechanism to generate social integration by their emphasis on “the capacity of differences to be
united” rather than a search for “commonality” in any form.21
Despite the momentum behind these ideas of transnationalism and multiculturalism in the
academic community and in certain areas of political debate, state migration policies refuse to
reconceptualize their ideas of unitary legal and cultural belonging, even in the face of increasing
cultural difference. What we find instead is an increasing emphasis by states on defining a single
national identity, a phenomenon that signifies “the ‘return of the local’ in a world that believes it
is globalizing.”22 Nowhere is this emphasis on the local more apparent than in the introduction of
the term “autochthon” to the Dutch political vocabulary in the early 1990s as a way of defining
those who are “of the Netherlands,” in opposition to the “allochthonous” foreign migrants.
III. Dutch Multicultural Policy
In the aftermath of World War II the Netherlands began receiving large numbers and large
groups of immigrants for the first time in its history. In the beginning these immigrants were
mostly “repatriates” returning to the Netherlands after the decolonization of the Dutch EastIndies, and public policy “directed at rapid assimilation of these returning compatriots” was the
obvious response.23 The policy succeeded, but the assimilation of these repatriates into Dutch
society reinforced the idea that the Netherlands “was anything but a country of immigration” and
cultural diversity.24
A. Guest Workers
Subsequent immigrant groups were not so easily assimilated. In order to provide sufficient labor
for national industry, the Dutch government encouraged the temporary migration of workers
from outside the Netherlands in the 1960s and early 1970s. At first these migrants came from
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Southern European countries and former Dutch colonies, as well as Suriname and the Dutch
Antilles, but demand for labor required that the Netherlands invite workers from Turkey and
Morocco as well. These laborers were consciously not termed immigrants “so as to avoid
creating the illusion that they were permanent settlers,” and were instead referred to as “guestworkers,” with the expectation that they would eventually return to their home countries. The
emphasis on the temporary nature of the guest-workers residence in the Netherlands prevented
the government from enacting any policies aimed at bridging the gap between these workers and
the larger Dutch society. Instead, the Dutch government enacted policies encouraging bonding
within guest-worker communities that aimed “to preserve the internal group structures [of the
transplanted workers] and [workers’] children were offered facilities for education in their own
language and culture.”25 The assumption of the government was that any sort of bridging
between these guest-workers and larger Dutch society might “hamper their return to their home
countries.”26
This policy of migrant isolation led to growing tensions, and in the case of some Moluccan
immigrants, the isolation escalated to radicalization. The resulting terrorist acts “became a
catalyst for drawing attention to the marginalized position of these immigrants in particular and
of migrants in general.”27 One positive outcome of this unfortunate situation was that, “for the
first time, the issue of how to give immigrants a permanent position in Dutch society emerged on
the political agenda.”28
B. A Multi-Ethnic Society?
The Dutch government of the 1980s approached the issue of minority belonging “in the context
of an ‘open, multi-ethnic society.’”29 In reality, this meant that rather than an isolationist policy
toward minority groups, the government began to approach minorities as less defined by static
group identity and more as “dynamic and heterogeneous.” It proposed a policy of bridging with
the intent of preventing “processes of cultural isolation and socio-economic deprivation.”30
Entailed in this policy was an emphasis on “adaptation to national norms and values,” and of an
orientation towards the state and citizenship rather than towards “minority groups that might turn
their backs on society.31 There was still a place for minority group bonding within this new
approach to the problem, but “bridging was seen as a positive condition for bonding, as bridging
would contribute to a better socio-economic position for minorities and consequently allow more
room for them to experience their own cultural identities as well as secure more tolerance toward
these minorities.”32 This multiculturalist policy led as well to an “institutionalization of
pluralism” in the Dutch government, and an institution called the National Consultation and
Advisory Council for Minorities was created as a tool to ensure the accurate representation of
ethnic minority interests in policy-making.33
Though in many other European countries immigrant minorities were defined by their racial
difference, “in the Netherlands they were instead defined by ethnic and cultural origin (cultural
non-conformity).” Although seen as more liberal at the time, this categorization has proved to be
more resilient and equally divisive.34 This model, which Jan Rath termed the Minorities
Paradigm, “legitimizes government interference with ethnic minorities” while also allowing the
government to exclude ethnic minorities from mainstream political and economic debate due to
their “social-cultural non-conformity.”35 This exclusion “helped to strengthen the ‘imagined
national community’” of the Netherlands by providing a visible example for Dutch society as to
what is not the norm.36

5

C. Integration: The End of Multiculturalism
In the early 1990s, as government involvement in minority group bonding began to be criticized,
the concept of “ethnic minority” also began to be “regularly replaced by [the term]
‘allochthonous.’” This marked a shift from a multiculturalist approach to a more individual,
citizenship-based conception of the solution.37 This shift was exemplified in the policy’s name
change from “‘Minorities Policy’ to ‘Integration Policy.’”38 Structurally, this shift meant an
increase in civic integration courses, the reduced instruction of minority languages in school
curriculums, and, with regard to policy formation, the advisory role of immigrant organizations
“was downgraded to a mere consultative role.”39 If they wanted to have their voices heard,
immigrants needed to take an active role in exercising their own citizenship rights as individuals
rather than as primarily members of a certain social group.
D. After 9/11: Assimilation
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the government policy shifted once again, this time to an
assimilationist track. Rather than being seen as a tool for socio-economic integration, bridging
between minority groups and the wider Dutch society began to include “a degree of sociocultural adaptation.”40 Instead of a focus on the “active citizenship” of the 1990s, which put a
greater emphasis on the individual and the importance of individual political engagement as it
phased out minority-group-based programs, the Dutch government, in response to populist
movements, began to promote “common citizenship,” which includes cultural norms along with
civic and political responsibilities. In order to avoid “being blamed for ignoring the voice from
the street,” Dutch politicians framed the problem in the interest of the majority, rather than
approaching it with an eye for equity, as in the 1990s, or with attention to the interests of the
minority.41 Despite the seeming continuity of Dutch multiculturalist policy, in reality the past
half-century has seen a succession of at least three distinct policies. The goals of these policies
have not simply changed, but in many cases “the effects of policies from a particular period were
negatively valued in other[s],” with the consequence being that policymakers began to see
stricter and stricter measures as necessary because previous policies seemed to be failing.42
E. The Effects of the Rhetoric of Autochthony on Migrants to the Netherlands
“The most prominent dividing line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in Dutch society at
this point in time is country of origin.”43
The term allochthonous, which refers to immigrants to the Netherlands or those of immigrant
descent since the early 1990s, has its origins in geological terminology. It is used to refer to
rocks or other minerals “not formed in the region where found,”44 and carries with it a subtext
due to its etymology that, “allochthonous entities retain characteristics that identify them as
‘belonging’ elsewhere many long years after their initial displacement.”45 The modern idea of
autochthony, however, which is very closely related to the original definition of the word, is not
simply an objective statement about the relationship between a person and his or her place of
birth; it also constitutes a political statement implying that this connection represents “the most
authentic form of belonging,” to the detriment of any who wish to claim a connection to a
territory without being originally “of that land.”46
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In Greek philosophy this idea was articulated by Plato, using the voice of Socrates, who
claimed autochthony as the basis of Athenian democracy when he said that, “we and our
people…being all born of one mother, claim to be neither the slaves of one another nor the
masters; rather does our natural birth-equality drive us to seek legal equality.”47 A sharp critique
of this policy also comes from the Greeks in the playwright Euripedes’ tragedy Ion. In this play,
the title character observes that: “if a foreigner, even though nominally a citizen, comes into that
pure-bred city, his tongue is enslaved and he has no freedom of speech.”48
Despite the seeming inflexibility of the definition of autochthony as applied in the Netherlands,
the status of autochthon is denied not only to those who are born outside of the Netherlands, but
also to those with as little as one allochthonous grandparent. Although the term had been
introduced as a way to avoid the same negative connotations that had come to be associated with
the word “migrant,” this way of defining it assured that it would take on a similarly problematic
meaning. The consequences of this definition are that it is possible not only to define a person
born on Dutch soil as foreign and “not of the land,” but also to define their children, who are
citizens of the Netherlands from birth, as foreign.49 Imposing such a rigid definition of the
“other,” such that it actually creates the “other” within the Dutch citizenry, only supports the idea
that immigrants will never be able to integrate completely.50 The paradox of autochthony, and
the reason that it cannot be a sustainable response to globalizing trends, is that it “celebrates the
primacy of being rooted as something self-evident, but it does so to enable participation in a
world shaped by migration.”51
IV. Minority Representation and Democracy
A. Is Descriptive Representation Desirable?
Although the democratic system is naturally a system of majority rule, in practice it is vital that
every democratic system of government has certain mechanisms to protect the rights and
advance the interests of minority groups within the state. Strict pursuit of policies in favor of the
majority with no attention to the desires of the minority serve only to further reproduce the
factors that distinguish these groups from one another. Therefore, those policies can only
reproduce and amplify the dissatisfaction of minority groups who feel that they are not
represented by their government. There are many mechanisms that can be used to create this sort
of representation, but the most common, and the one I focus on in this study, is called
“descriptive representation.”
Descriptive representation occurs when members of a minority group are elected to office in
proportional numbers to their share of the population. Though in some cases this sort of
representation is reached by the use of quotas, it can also be approximated by the use of
proportional parliamentary representation (as in the Netherlands) so long as structures are in
place to encourage minority political involvement and voting. The idea behind this sort of
representation (rather than substantive representation in which minority interests are advanced by
specific elected officials who may or may not share their minority status) is not just the
controversial assertion that members of specific minority groups understand the situation of their
identity group better than any other representative due to the shared experiences they have with
other members of the minority group. The more important impact of this type of representation is
that the visible presence of minorities in government helps to legitimize that government for the
minority groups. In this way, not only do they feel as though their voices are being heard, but
also that the state is a place that welcomes them as well as members of the society’s majority
7

identity: “The presence of minority elected officials sends out a contextual cue to minority
citizens that the benefits of voting outweigh the costs of not voting.”52 This is the aspect of
descriptive representation that I see as most vital for the successful integration of these minority
groups into a society as a whole. Minority communities are often faulted for their lack of
political engagement and civic activism, but too often the proper government mechanisms for
minority political participation are not in place and those who wish to participate cannot. This
not only inhibits the capacity of minorities to become active in their own government, but also
denies them the opportunity to demonstrate their identification with a community beyond their
ethnic group by participating in national civic society.53
The reluctance of many states to provide these avenues for the political incorporation of
minorities, despite the high degree of civic integration that this demonstrates, has its roots in the
fear of the disassociation of the nation from the state. Having already entered the cultural and
economic realms, entrance into the political sphere represents the final “infringement” of the
“other” into the realm of the natives.54 Otto Bauer’s opus on the multicultural German state in
the late 1800s provides a startlingly relevant description of the modern European situation. He
contends that, notwithstanding the necessity of multicultural governance, the threat posed by the
incorporation of “foreign” nationals into the apparatus of the state is that, “the despised national
adversary now became the representative of the power of the state,” resulting in what is seen as
“a form of foreign domination.”55 This popular perception is flawed, however, because the desire
to become involved in the politics of the state you live in signifies a high level of affiliation to
and identification with that state, which is exactly what most nationalists believe needs to be
created among non-native residents and citizens.
In his study of the various types of legal and cultural belonging, Jussie Ronkainen found that of
the many types of belonging, “only identification to community brings along active
participation.”56 Similarly, in Barbara Donovan’s exploration of minority representation in
Germany she found that, “‘homeland’ orientations [are] most prevalent in municipalities that
‘offer immigrants few channels of access to the decision-making process and grant them little
legitimacy in the public domain’ whereas political orientations directed toward the host country
were more likely to be present in cases where there was more political inclusion.”57 In this way,
“descriptive representation becomes a facilitator of social inclusion”58 as participation
“strengthens representational links, [and] fosters more positive attitudes towards government,”
easing the tensions between the state and minorities, and providing minorities an avenue through
which they can contribute positively to the state in which they live.59
B. How are Ethnic Minorities Represented throughout Europe?
The European Union is home to around twenty million Muslims, a group that has in many
countries come to be understood as synonymous with immigrant, foreign, and non-Western.
“Muslim” has become a label of ethnicity rather than simply a religious belief. Of these sixteen
million, fewer than thirty served in national parliaments throughout Europe in 2005.60 This
under-representation is primarily the result of strict naturalization laws and the lack of proper
mechanisms in society to allow and encourage new citizens to become involved in the state’s
political systems.
One example of this systemic lack is Germany, a country that faces many similar issues of
immigration as the Netherlands. Although Germany allows foreign residents access to state
programs, such as welfare, housing, and public education, “political citizenship comes only with
naturalization.”61 There is no institutional mechanism of democratic consultation between the
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government and the Muslim community, and the Muslim/migrant community as a whole is
generally viewed as disengaged from the political process. This perception, however, is not held
up by the facts, as the participation levels of migrants are “quite typical, given their education
and income levels.”62 The strongest predictors of political engagement among German citizens
are not national or ethnic identity, but rather age and education.63 The perception of
disengagement, then, is caused by the fact that many in the Muslim community are prohibited
from becoming politically involved due to their immigration status. Instead, when they are
refused the possibility of participating in mainstream political organizations, Muslims are often
encouraged to join or create Muslim-only organizations, which increases the sense of the
segregation of immigrant communities.64 This perception can be remedied via the adoption of
less strict citizenship requirements or through the extension of political involvement to residents,
as has been done in countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands, measures that increase
immigrant participation in mainstream political organizations.
Danish law allows foreign residents of Danish municipalities to vote in local elections and
even run for local elected office as long as they have lived legally in the country for four
consecutive years (up from three years, prior to 2010).65 Participation in civic life is not tied to
citizenship, and even as Danish immigration laws have become much stricter over the past few
years this distinction has remained. At the peak of this open policy, in the early 2000s, the result
was a situation in which “the number of ethnic minorities in both the national parliament and
local councils in Denmark almost corresponds to their number in the general population.”66 The
Danish system for local elections is a proportional system in which “the selection of candidates
from the party list is strongly influenced by each candidate’s personal votes.”67 This means that
candidates can move up the list if they garner more votes than those above them, a process called
list-jumping, and it is through this mechanism that three-fifths of the ethnic minority candidates
won in the 2001 Danish elections.68
Despite the Danish electoral system’s openness to foreign citizens, a disproportionate majority
of the elected ethnic minority representatives have taken Danish citizenship. While “60 percent
of the minority electorate” are foreign citizens, only “25 percent of the elected candidates hold
foreign citizenship.”69 This shows that despite the openness of the political system to foreign
citizens, Danish citizenship is still an attractive option for those looking to get into politics in
Denmark. Interestingly, the motivation for many ethnic minority candidates to run for elected
office is prior employment in the public sector, specifically work that deals directly with the
integration of immigrants into national society:70 “It is those building the bridges between the
immigrant community and the municipality who have entered local politics.”71 In the Danish
elections of 2001, for example, “26 percent of the ethnic minority representatives in local
councils had been members of the immigration councils in the preceding years.”72 This
demonstrates the importance and the effectiveness of integration programs that provide
minorities with a way into civic participation.
The legal structure in the Netherlands is currently quite similar to the Danish system, and the
rhetoric surrounding the issue of immigration over the past decade has made the Dutch situation
a very interesting one to examine due to the disconnect between national political rhetoric and
the legal frameworks that have been put together over the past five decades in response to
immigrants to the Netherlands.
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V. Immigrant Politicians in the Netherlands
A. How Does the Dutch Situation Compare to Other European Countries?
The Dutch electoral system is one of the most liberal in the world. The Netherlands was one of
the earliest European countries to grant voting rights in local elections to foreign citizens, doing
so in 1985. Five years of legal residence are required before non-citizens can exercise this right,
which makes it slightly more restrictive than Danish law, but still quite open.73 Municipal
elections also do not require pre-registration in order to vote, another factor that makes it much
easier for people who are not in the habit of voting regularly to participate in Dutch democracy.74
Strangely enough, this enfranchisement was not the result of a long battle by immigrants
themselves who mobilized to demand representation. Instead, it was the result of a decision by
the Dutch political elite who, in order to maintain order and generate a sense of community
belonging among migrants, felt it was necessary for foreign residents to be enfranchised at the
local level.75 Only Dutch citizens can participate in national elections, but despite this a large
share of immigrant-origin minorities participate. Two-thirds of Moroccans and Turks in the
Netherlands hold Dutch citizenship, and “in the 2006 parliamentary elections, 1.2 million
persons originating from the main immigrant countries approximately 10 per cent of the total
electorate had the right to vote.”76 After those same elections, politicians of non-Western origin
held 11.3 percent of the seats in the national parliament, a proportion actually higher than the
percentage of the electorate with immigrant origins.77
Representation is even better in large cities, and in most cases the number of elected politicians
of foreign origin is proportionate to the number of foreign-origin residents of the cities.78 In
Rotterdam, the city with the best rate of representation for immigrants, candidates get their
names out through “targeted campaigns in the languages of the ethnic groups” and through
meetings “organized through the migrant associations.”79 The result is that immigrant voters turn
out in large numbers and take the opportunity to issue a preferential vote for a specific candidate
at a much higher rate than do the “native” Dutch.80 Despite the momentum that immigrant
representatives gain from the support of their ethnic communities, once they are elected many
find themselves in a frustrating situation. On the basis of their recent electoral successes it would
seem that immigrants to the Netherlands are both highly integrated and highly accepted, but this
is not the case. Despite the electoral structure of the Netherlands, which supports the
enfranchisement and representation of minority groups, the culture of Dutch national politics in
the last decade has become increasingly hostile to immigrants. This hostility has made it nearly
impossible for immigrant-origin representatives to advance the issues relevant to their
communities, despite the strength of their support and their willingness to work within the
system.
B. How does the Situation Look from the Vantage Point of the Immigrant Politician?
The current situation of Dutch politics with regard to ethnic minorities is best summarized by
one Muslim member of parliament interviewed by Jytte Klausen in 2005: “it is difficult today to
argue that Muslims have special needs…All Dutch voters can think about is how they are
disadvantaged by foreigners.”81 Compounding this initial prejudice, says Farah Karimi, an
Iranian refugee to the Netherlands who held office in the Dutch Lower House from 1998 to
2006, is the “lacking of courage” on the part of Dutch politicians “to explain certain unpopular
policies” that actually have the interests of all Dutch at their core.82 One example of such a
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policy, according to Karimi, is “public funding for Islamic schools or for the education of imams
…to counter the influence of countries like Saudi Arabia on the [Dutch] Muslim community.”83
This climate, according to a poll conducted in Klausen’s study of European Muslim leaders, is
fostered first and foremost by negative press treatment of Muslims; secondary factors include
right-wing anti-Islam rhetoric and the lack of economic opportunities for working age
Muslims.84 The convergence of all of these factors negative press coverage, right-wing
domination of public political conversation, the reluctance of fellow politicians to present the
case for reasonable policies, and the strong party discipline that characterizes European
parliaments means that, “for many Muslim politicians, who need the support of party
colleagues to get ahead, Islam and discrimination amount to what Americans call the third rail of
politics: ‘you touch it and you’re dead.’”85
C. The Effects of the Current Dutch Political Climate on Immigrant Political Involvement
While the Netherlands guarantees full political and electoral rights to migrants, and can claim
one of the most liberal policies in the European Union with regard to the ability of non-citizens
to vote and even run for local elected office (a policy that has led to near proportionate ethnic
representation in local parliaments and city councils), the Netherlands still fails to provide the
sort of stable local consultative political structures that encourage migrants to make their voices
heard in policy debates.86 Despite the impressive penetration of minority politicians into Dutch
politics, many feel unable to adequately address the issues facing migrant communities due
either to the need to subordinate their views to that of the party or to fears that bringing forth
these complaints will pigeonhole them as the “Moroccan” or “Turkish” representative, rather
than someone representing the legitimate concerns of all those who voted to elect them.87
While there have been many minority politicians who have succeeded in winning elected office
in the Netherlands, the average response to a Eurobarometer question in 2009 about how (on a
scale of 1 to 10) the respondent would feel about “having a person from a different ethnic origin
than the majority of the population in the highest elected political position in your country?” was
6.4, placing the Netherlands just above average for European countries (6.2).88 More favorable
responses to this question include Sweden (8.0), Denmark (7.2), the United Kingdom (7.0),
Spain (7.1), France (7.3), and Poland (7.2), among others.89 The same poll reveals that only 38
percent of the Dutch are able to declare that they would feel not at all uncomfortable with an
elected official to national office being of a minority ethnic background (compared to 66% of
Swedes, 53% of French, 50% of British, 58% of Danes, 47% of Spanish, and 48% of Polish).90
The numbers are extremely similar when the same question is asked with regard to elected
officials of a different religion from the majority of the population.91
These results indicate a possible decrease in the number of “ethnic” Dutch who welcome
representatives of a different ethnicity from the results of a 2006 Eurobarometer poll in which 49
percent of respondents felt that the Netherlands needed more politicians of different ethnic
origins.92 This decrease could be attributed to the persistent negative portrayals of migrant
communities over the last decade.
At the same time, however, the level of political participation by migrant communities seems
to be shrinking, a fact that is especially visible in larger cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam,
where there are large communities of politically engaged migrants. In 2002, in the immediate
aftermath of the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, when the issue of migrant cultural assimilation
really came to prominence in Dutch national politics, only 22 percent of Moroccan-Dutch
eligible voters in Amsterdam and 40 percent in Rotterdam turned out in the national election, but
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by 2006 these numbers had risen to 37 and 58 percent, respectively.93 The year 2010 saw a small
rise in Amsterdam, to 39 percent, although turnout among Turkish-Dutch voters fell from 51 to
46 percent.94 In Rotterdam, turnout among Moroccan-Dutch fell to around 46 percent.95 Looking
at patterns of representation for these communities, we see a similar pattern of slight decline in
the recent election as the number of non-Western city councillors in Amsterdam fell from nine to
seven, a decline that means that only 16 percent of the city council has non-Western origins.96
Looking at national turnout of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands between 2006 and 2010
confirms this pattern. Although FORUM, an institute for Dutch multicultural research, predicted
44 percent turnout nationally among all ethnic minority groups in 2006, that number was only 34
percent in 2010. There are many possible explanations for this decline, and the one put forth by
the organization that carried out the study is that the debate over immigration and integration
seemed to have calmed down in recent years, which led to decreased urgency among the migrant
populations with regard to voting. Unfortunately, this relaxation in voting habits may result in
less accurate representation of these migrant groups, with only 3.1 percent of council members
nationally being of migrant origin after the 2010 elections.97 This number, while about two
percentage points below the percentage of Dutch residents with Muslim cultural origins, is
nonetheless about equal to if not greater than the percentage of naturalized allochthonous
Dutch.98 What this shows is that even though the national political climate of the Netherlands has
turned to one of exclusion of newcomers, the electoral structure of the country has made it
possible for immigrants to gain representation. As long as this electoral structure remains
unchanged, Irene Bloemraad posits that minority representation is “sticky” and can outlast shifts
in public opinion against migrants.99 What comes of this representation is yet to be seen, and
though migrant-origin representatives have thus far been unable to redefine the landscape of the
integration debate, their continued presence in the debates and influence in Dutch national policy
has the potential to ensure that the Dutch state realizes its responsibility to all of its residents and
citizens, not just those that it considers autochthonous.
VI. Conclusion: The Effects of Immigrant Political Involvement
on Integration and Acceptance
The ability of nation-states to welcome culturally different immigrants into the governing
apparatus of the state will be one of the most important factors in determining the continuing
relevance of the state. The experience of immigrants to the Netherlands is affected by the
rhetoric of autochthony that predominates in national political rhetoric, but in many ways their
presence as civically engaged, publicly minded individuals helps to counter the imagined divide
between the foreign and the native that Dutch immigration rhetoric has created. Despite the
transnational cultural flows that these immigrants introduce into the territory of the Dutch state
and the perception of many that these flows threaten the sovereignty of the Dutch state, the effect
of immigrant involvement in politics is not a decrease in the relevance of the state, but rather the
heightening of a civic instead of a cultural sense of nationality among citizens. This in turn
strengthens the nation-state and helps it adapt to the modern international order of increased
migration. However, this involvement also brings complications. At the same time that the
introduction of minority groups into the political sphere signifies a high degree of civic
integration, it also represents the final infringement of the “other” into the realm of the
“natives.”100
Political integration is one of the best ways to create a sense of civic belonging among
migrants. Yet without proper framing by the state, it can increase national apprehensions among
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those who see a single Dutch national identity as intricately linked with the state. Evidence for
both of these statements can be found in the recent history of Dutch politics: in the fierce
opposition to the nomination for Mayor of Rotterdam of Ahmed Aboutaleb, as a result of his
dual citizenship, and in the way that migrants disproportionately cast preferential votes for a
candidate with a similar ethnic background as themselves. Though Dutch electoral policy still
encourages immigrant integration into politics, in recent years it has taken certain steps that
make migrant political integration more difficult. In this way it is obstructing the creation of a
sense of national civic identity that could help to pave the way for closer inter-cultural interface
and mutual understanding within Dutch society.
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